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We Are All Farkhunda: An Examination of the Treatment of Women within Afghanistan’s
Formal Legal System
ASHLEY LENDERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In March 2015, the President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, “promised to work towards a
commitment to women’s rights, a transformation of the legal system, and a pledge to defeat
terrorism.”1 This pledge is timely and necessary because violence against women in Afghanistan
is widespread. A 2012 Oxfam report found that eighty-seven percent of women and girls in
Afghanistan will be victims of physical, sexual, or psychological violence, or forced marriage
during their lifetimes.2
In this paper, I will examine three cases of violence against women that went through the
Afghan formal legal system: the case of Farkhunda, the Paghman district gang rape case, and the
case of Sahar Gul. In the first Part, I will discuss the formal legal system framework on which
the cases are based. In the second Part, I will discuss the cases in detail. In the third Part, I will
describe neo-liberal, reformist, and neo-fundamentalist approaches to interpretation of Islamic
law, and I will then draw out pieces of the decisions from the three cases that closely match these
tenets. Finally, I will use these interpretations to argue that Afghanistan can improve its legal
system through such advancements as the televising of trials, the creation of a civil remedy
system, and a call for activism, which would enable an understanding of Islam that is more
favorable to women’s rights.
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I. BACKGROUND OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS CASES IN THE FORMAL LEGAL SYSTEM
Within Afghanistan’s formal legal system, a hierarchy of laws exists for cases of violence
against women. First, there is a system of international human rights laws and principles to
protect women from violence. Afghanistan is a signatory to the Convention on Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, or “CEDAW.”3 Under CEDAW, Afghanistan has an
obligation to take all necessary actions to “prevent, protect against and respond to violence
against women, whether perpetrated by private or public actors.”4 Significantly, Afghanistan was
the first Muslim country to sign and ratify CEDAW without reservations.5
The ratification of CEDAW in 2003 gave women’s rights activists leverage in arguing for
the inclusion of the equality of women in the Afghan constitution and thus colors judicial
interpretation of the guarantee of equality.6 The Supreme Court also looks to the clause of the
constitution guaranteeing Sharia law, which traditionalists often argue contradicts CEDAW.7
These competing interpretations of CEDAW and the constitution shape courtroom debate and
strategy. The United Nations General Assembly Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (“Declaration”) also places obligations and restrictions on
the government of Afghanistan.8 The Declaration allows non-judicial means where appropriate,9
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such as the shuras and jirgas10 of Afghan customary laws. It also calls for an expansion of
judicial and administrative mechanisms to better respond to cases of violence against women.11
Another source of law to protect women in the formal legal framework is the national
law. In 2009, President Hamid Karzai passed the Elimination of Violence against Women Law
(“EVAW”) by presidential decree, which criminalized twenty-two acts of violence and harmful
traditional practices against women and girls.12 The law is in effect because the president decreed
it, but it has yet to pass Parliament.13 EVAW remains the main legislative tool used to protect
women from violence in Afghanistan.14
EVAW allows women to make claims against their perpetrators while also allowing them
to withdraw a claim at any time, with exceptions for rape and forced prostitution.15 Often,
women are afraid to press criminal charges because the accused men are the primary source of
income for their families, and the women face societal pressure to drop their cases.16 Women are
more likely to come forward if the case can instead be referred to mediation and the breadwinner
will not necessarily be detained.17 However, claims for the worst offenses cannot be withdrawn
and those perpetrators will still face trial.18
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Under EVAW, the government also has an obligation to take protective and supportive
measures to help women, expanding on the principles already set out in CEDAW.19 However,
EVAW contains many major gaps. For example, domestic violence is not criminalized in
Afghanistan.20 As of November 2016, the parliamentary Commission on Women, Civil Society,
and Human Rights was considering draft amendments that would create punishments for civil
rights violations and provide women’s shelters.21 Additionally, the Supreme Court works to
protect women’s rights in limited circumstances. In December 2015, the Supreme Court issued a
judicial ruling that banned the imprisonment of women for running from their homes if they fled
to a medical provider, the police, or the house of a close male relative.22
Despite laws that aim to protect women, there are still many problems in the formal legal
system. Formal divorce laws make it very difficult for women to obtain a divorce.23 A woman
must prove that her husband has stopped providing for her,24 whereas a man may simply declare
himself divorced.25 This makes it particularly difficult for women to escape domestic abuse
situations, as domestic violence is not a proper ground for divorce26 or even a crime. If a woman
cannot get a divorce and chooses to leave, she is punished for running away from her family,
while her abuser will face no punishment.27 Four hundred women and girls are imprisoned for
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so-called moral crimes in Afghanistan.28 Many of these crimes involve fleeing from domestic
violence or a forced marriage.29 A common accusation is zina—or sex outside marriage—when a
woman has been raped or forced into prostitution.30 Zina is punishable by up to 15 years of
prison.31 Women and girls in domestic violence situations describe abuses such as “beatings,
stabbings, burnings, rapes, forced prostitution, kidnapping, and murder threats,” but do not report
the incidents to the authorities.32 The same police who punish women for zina often ignore
evidence of the abuse.33 Often, women do not report because of insecurity, cultural belief, and
fear of retaliation or stigmatization.34 Furthermore, when women do report, they are not always
believed.35 In one instance, a woman was told that it was culturally unacceptable to place a
complaint against a relative.36 N., age 24, from Samangan province, was called a prostitute and
told to leave the police station when she tried to report her abuser.37 Because of these incidents,
Afghanistan could be in violation of its obligations to protect women under CEDAW.38
Islamic law is hugely influential in both the formal and informal legal systems in
Afghanistan. Sharia courts exist throughout the country.39 Despite popular perception, customary
law often subverts Islamic law.40 The distinction between the two is somewhat tenuous and
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circular. Although Islamic law is supposed to be supreme, “Islamic laws are often suborned by
prevalent customary tribal norms, which are themselves assumed to conform with Islamic law.”41
In Afghanistan, customary law tends to focus on restorative justice rather than the retributive
justice that is familiar in the United States.42 The goal is to restore the rule-breaker to society
rather than to punish him.43 In fact, the customary system of Afghanistan is very different from
formal legal systems. There are no lawyers or evidentiary rules.44 The legal process itself
incorporates several elements of tribal life, including the involvement of families, neighbors, and
elders.45 The people sitting on the mediation counsel can be the victim’s neighbors, family
members, and respected members of her community,46 but they can also be the neighbors and
family of the abuser.
Using the formal legal system instead of the informal legal system can help protect
women’s rights. There are three different kinds of mediation systems in Afghanistan. Of the
cases studied in a recent report by the United Nations, forty-seven percent of mediation cases
went through EVAW law institutions, seventeen percent went through NGOs, and twenty-two
percent went through traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.47 The United Nations found that
only five percent of criminal cases involving violence against women ended in prosecution and
sanctions.48 In traditional mediation courts, unification of the family is the goal and not justice
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for the victim.49 Women often choose traditional mediation in cases of domestic violence.50 For
example, out of the eighty cases of battery and laceration studied, fifty-two went through
traditional mediation.51 Only four of these eighty went through the formal legal system.52 This
can particularly problematic for women’s human rights as they are sometimes not allowed to be
present at their mediations.53 Ten percent of the mediations resulted from a woman being forced
to go through mediation over the formal legal system.54 Worse yet, the study tracked the
enforcement of twenty-five cases and found that over half of the perpetrators did not honor the
agreement made during mediation.55 Compounding the unbalanced nature of mediations, once an
agreement has been reached, a criminal conviction in the formal legal system will not be
enforced.56
One reason for the high number of mediations despite clearly unbalanced outcomes is
that more women prefer civil remedies that the formal legal system is not yet equipped to
provide. These civil remedies include divorce, fair alimony, custody settlements, and living
without domestic violence.57 The formal legal system only deals with these issues through
criminal punishment. As discussed above, women often do not want to report a crime and risk
the breadwinner being imprisoned. There are no protective or restraining orders in the formal
legal system.58 For women to truly seek and receive justice, the formal legal system must be
strengthened.
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II. CASES
A. Farkhunda
On March 19, 2015, twenty-seven year-old Farkhunda was surrounded, jumped on,
kicked, trampled, run over, set on fire, and tossed into the shallows of the Kabul River by a
crowd of men.59 Members of the crowd surrounding her filmed the attack on cell phones and
placed the videos on social media.60 Other onlookers shouted “Allahu Akbar” while watching
the carnage.61 Members of the police stood by without quelling the violence and some officers
even participated in it.62
This horrific attack took place in the shadow of the Shah-Du-Shamshaira mosque and
shrine, which is within blocks of the presidential palace and main bazaar of Kabul.63 Many come
to the mosque and shrine to seek the “guardians of the shrine”—men selling charms and amulets
that ward off disease or issues such as infertility and family disputes.64 Farkhunda herself had
only been to the shrine once before and saw women standing in the cold. She came back to bring
a sweater to one of them.65 Her father said, “She was always keen to help poor people, especially
women.”66 While at the shrine, it is believed that she attempted to confront one of the men
selling amulets about “superstitious practices” that were not in line with Islam.67 The man grew
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enraged and accused her of burning the Koran and working with the infidels, inciting the
attack.68
This accusation could not have been further from the truth. Farkhunda was training to be
a religious teacher.69 Her father says that she was always interested in Islam, even from a young
age.70 Her religious education had led her to condemn the man’s acts as contrary to Islam and an
attempt to con the destitute out of their money. A special investigation proved that the allegation
that she burned a Koran was baseless.71 Many women’s rights advocates were enraged soon after
the attack, but once it was widely known that she was a religious scholar, many in Afghanistan
were enraged.72 She became known as “Afghanistan’s Daughter.”73
When Farkhunda was buried on March 22, women’s rights activists broke precedent by
carrying her coffin instead of allowing her male relatives to do so. While the activists were
carrying her, they cried out “maa hama Farkhunda yem,” or “We are all Farkhunda.”74 Activists
remain instrumental in ensuring that Farkhunda’s memory lives on. They have created a shrine to
her at Shah-Du-Shamshaira. Shortly after the attack, activists reenacted the crime to draw
attention to the violence.75 President Ashraf Ghani weighed in on the incident, calling it a
“heinous attack.”76
One factor that impacted the trial outcome was the reaction of the ulema, or Islamic
clergy. There was a concern that Islam would be blamed for the attack as it took place outside of
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a mosque. And in fact, some did blame Islam—there were anti-clerical posts on social media in
the days following the attack.77 Members of a fringe leftist group shouted “death to mullahs”
during a Kabul demonstration.78 The ulema responded in kind, saying, “I warn those who use
this opportunity that women will be killed more heinously than our sister [Farkhunda], and many
will be eliminated in a far worse way. Then, nobody will dare raise their voice.”79 However,
many clerics and citizens alike honored Farkhunda’s memory by pointing out that the attackers
were not acting in the spirit of Islam, but rather that Islam condemns violence against women
and encourages peace.80 The reaction of the clerics is better seen as a reaction against the
direction in which some see the country moving. Many clerics believe that the government is in a
“struggle against Islam.”81 Interestingly, clerics have distanced themselves and Islam from the
attack, that all of the perpetrators were illiterate men who had never read the Koran.82
The trial in the primary court took just two days. The court took less than forty-eight
hours to try forty-nine people.83 Judge Safiullah Mujadidi was the presiding judge. Twenty-seven
men were found not guilty—eighteen civilians and nine police officers.84 Twelve civilians
received convictions, including four who received the death penalty. Ten police officers were
convicted of failing to protect Farkhunda.85 An official investigation of the police officers
conducted by a presidentially-mandated commission found that police lost control of the
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situation. The commission recommended emergency training to emphasize better communication
and management.86
The court case was particularly influential because it was one of the first to be televised.87
This allowed the citizens to actively engage with their formal legal system and learn how a case
goes through the court. However, for Mujbullah, Farkhunda’s brother, the outcome did not seem
like justice. He decried it, saying, “The outcome of the trial is not fair and we do not accept it—
you saw just four people sentenced to death but everybody knows that more than 40 people were
involved in martyring and burning and beating my sister.”88
Devastatingly, Mujbullah’s cries of injustice proved to be warranted. Mujbullah and other
members Farkhunda’s family were denied what little justice they received from the primary
court. A secret hearing in the appellate court reversed the primary court’s decision.89 The
appellate court reduced the sentences of the men convicted of having a primary role in
Farkhunda’s death.90 The Court overturned three death sentences and converted them to twentyyear prison sentences. The fourth death sentence was commuted to ten years in prison. Some of
the convicted parties received an acquittal. 91 This hearing occurred without the knowledge or
presence of Farkhunda’s family.92 The appellate court is required to submit a written explanation
but has yet to do so.93
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Farkhunda’s family appealed to the Supreme Court, but the sentence reductions were
upheld.94 Kimberly Motley, a Minneapolis-born attorney who was the first non-Afghan to argue
a case before the Afghan Supreme Court, recommended the appeal.95 She originally represented
Farkhunda’s family but left after initial deliberations. 96 She also recommended an internal
investigation into the appellate court judges who made the decision without the input of lawyers
and family or observance of due process rights.97
B. Paghman Gang Rapes
On August 23, 2014, four women and an unconfirmed number of men were returning
from a wedding through the Paghman district, a popular picnic area, in Kabul when seven men
dressed in police uniforms stopped them.98 The attackers tied the men up and pulled the women
out of the car before raping them.99
The attack caused public outcry, including President Hamid Karzai calling for the death
penalty. This trial was also televised, although it lasted only two hours.100 Seven men originally
received the death penalty, although two were commuted to life sentences.101 The same judge
who presided over the Farkhunda trial, Judge Safihullah Mujadidi, presided.102 President Karzai
signed the death warrants on his last day in office.103
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It is important to note there were some problems with the way the case was handled.
Instead of being accused of rape, the perpetrators were accused of zina, or sex outside marriage,
which also implicated the victims.104 The four victims never received assistance from female
police officers, despite an initiative by the Afghan government to have women police officers for
the convenience of victims. Because of cultural norms, it is preferable for female victims to
speak to female police officers about something as sensitive as sexual assault.105 Additionally,
the defense attorneys used the same language as the Farkhunda trials, “My clients did it because
they’re illiterate and ignorant,” and succeeded in reducing the perpetrators’ sentence.106
C. Sahar Gul
Sahar Gul was forced by her parents into an illegal marriage at a young age107 even
though EVAW prohibited child marriages.108 Sahar Gul was tied up, beaten, buried, and kept
captive in a basement for months by her husband.109 The trial court sentenced the husband and
his family to twenty years in prison, but the appellate court quietly overturned this decision, as in
the Farkhunda case. The Supreme Court overruled the appellate court and reaffirmed the
decision of the primary court.110
D. Lessons from Case Studies
The cases above illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the Afghan formal legal
system. A major strength of the primary court system is transparency. Both the Farkhunda and
Paghman gang rape cases were publicly televised, putting pressure on the courts to convict the
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abusers. In contrast, the appellate court held hearings in secret, and the judges did not experience
the same pressure to convict. This highlights a weakness of the legal system—the lack of basic
due process in the appellate court. The appellate court heard the case without notifying the
victims or their families of the appeal.
Another weakness was the trials’ brevity. The Farkhunda court took forty-eight hours to
convict forty-nine men, while the court in the Paghman case took two hours to convict seven.
Haste allows for potential miscarriage of justice, as neither side can prepare adequately, leading
to errors at trial and in the appellate courts, which are much less likely to convict abusers.
The cases also highlight the different interpretations of Islam present in Afghan courts.
The Farkhunda case elicited three different reactions: a contingent blamed Islam and cried “death
to mullahs.” Another group justified the actions of the perpetrators under Islam. By far the
largest group argued that the actions of the men were contrary to the spirit of Islam.
Interpretations of Islam diverge in public opinion as well as in the courts.
III. CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF ISLAM
A. Neoliberalism
The Neoliberal conceptualization of Islam emphasizes the compatibility of Islam with
human rights and capitalist development.111 Many Islamic scholars have determined that “what
you consider freedom in Europe is exactly what our religion views as justice (‘adl), right (haqq),
consultation (shura) and equality (musawat).”112 Neoliberal courts argue that human rights are
inherent in laws of Islam. The neoliberal interpretation of Islam focuses on three elements:
human rights, human dignity rather than honor, and community.

Nikos Moudouros, The ‘Harmonization’ of Islam with the Neoliberal Transformation: The Case of Turkey, 11
GLOBALIZATIONS 843, 846 (2014), https://anatolikotera.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/download-pdf.
112
Id.
111

In fact, neoliberals argue that the best approach to resolve human rights issues in Islamic
countries is to return to the roots of Islam.113 Both the Hadith and the Koran, the bases of sharia,
emphasize protection of the woman and women’s rights.114 Islam has historically been a unifying
factor in Afghanistan.115 It is possible to use religious tenets to moderate. Informal justice actors
have “expressed openness to overturning prevailing customary law and signaled their willingness
to take a more Islamic legal approach to resolving disputes if they were educated by the
particulars of Islamic law, especially as it pertained to women and understanding gender-related
norms.”116 An important shift for women’s rights will be to emphasize the human dignity of
Islam rather than Pashtunwali honor.117 Islam’s respect for human dignity can ensure equality
between men and women.
Neoliberal interpretations of Islam are often used to solve social problems because they
emphasize community.118 Neoliberalism emphasizes the Islamic values of community, good will,
and charity to others.119 These interpretations value accountability for one’s actions against the
community highly.120
The primary court system in Afghanistan appears to lean towards a neoliberal
interpretation of Islam, although it may not fully subscribe to it. For example, the reasoning
Farkhunda’s primary court case bears a striking resemblance to the neoliberal conceptualization
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as there was an emphasis on the accountability of the perpetrators. Farkhunda’s primary court
case saw the conviction of twenty-two men,121 indicating a preference for holding the
perpetrators accountable rather than blaming the victims.
Additionally, emphasized the value of Farkhunda’s life and the good of the community,
reflecting the Islamic principles of good will and cohesion of the community rather than viewing
of women as property. The court saw itself as trying to prevent a tragedy of this magnitude from
occurring again.
The courts’ decision in the Paghman district gang rape case also reflects a neoliberal
approach to Islam. The men received death sentences, showing a preference for accountability.
However, not all aspects of the case conformed to the neoliberal interpretation. The police
worked hard to deny the responsibility of the officers in the case.122 Additionally, human rights
advocates decried the use of the death penalty, as the president’s call for the death penalty before
a trial had occurred heavily influenced the sentence.123 However, the case reflects the neoliberal
Islamic value of aiding the community—the judge stated that he wanted to set a precedent that
future violence against women would not be tolerated.
In Sahar Gul’s case, both the primary court and the Supreme Court’s decisions leaned
more towards the neoliberal conceptualization of Islam. They emphasized the rights of Sahar Gul
to not be forced into a marriage and then horrifically abused by her husband. The courts
demonstrated a preference for holding the husband accountable for his actions toward his wife
rather than treating her like his property.
B. Reformism
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People who adhere to a reformist conceptualization of Islam “oppose traditionalist and
Islamist ideas, and project a new and modern concept of Islam.”124 The hallmark of reformism is
text-based analysis with a focus on different historic interpretations.125 However, reformists
subscribe to a wide spectrum of ideologies, from the right-wing to leftist. Reformists tend to
interpret the Koran to emphasize the reform of sharia, the equality of men and women, and
freedom of religion.126 Reformists attempt to reconcile Islam with the challenges of modernity
while still staying true to the teachings of Islam.127 Many seek to bring attention to women’s
rights violations.128
The basis of reformism is the interpretation of the holy scriptures of Islam.129 The Koran,
both in its form and its content, is the literal and unchangeable word of God. Reformism
emphasizes interpretation of the text rather than the words or passages themselves. Reformists
argue that the Koran is complicated to read and needs linguistic context, which allows for
different interpretations.130 Reformists especially emphasize leaving the principles of human
rights and constitutionality intact while preserving sharia. The unifying principle in sharia and
human rights is the view that poor treatment of women results not from the scripture itself, but
rather from the way it has been interpreted for hundreds of years.131 Often, neoliberals and
reformists come to the same conclusion, though they reach it through different reasoning.
Neoliberals look to the spirit of Islam and other ideals.132 Rather than interpreting the texts,
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neoliberals use the values of Islam to justify their view. In contrast, reformists look directly to
the text of the Koran and draw conclusions from a modern interpretation of it.
The reaction of the courts to the defendants in the Paghman rape case and the Farkhunda
case is evidence of reformist attitudes. In both cases, the courts pointed out that the defendants
were illiterate and could not read the Koran, thereby exculpating Islam and placing the blame on
the culture and the individuals themselves. Additionally, reformists tend to advocate for
women’s rights. The primary courts’ decisions in the Farkhunda case and the Sahar Gul case and
the Supreme Court’s decision in the Sahar Gul case reflect this.
C Neo-Fundamentalists and Conservatives
Unlike neoliberalism, neo-fundamentalist and conservative Islam emphasizes historic
cultural norms. Neo-fundamentalists and conservatives argue that Islam is incompatible with socalled western notions of Islam.133 Gender issues create the greatest disparity between neofundamentalism and neoliberalism—however, adherents of both claim that they are returning to
the roots of Islam.134 Similarly, both reformists and neo-fundamentalists place great emphasis on
the text itself. Reformists argue for updated interpretations of it, while neo-fundamentalists
advocate for traditional interpretations.
Neo-fundamentalist conceptualizations tend to focus on the individual rather than the
community.135 Neo-fundamentalism compares the lives of men now to those of men of ancient
times—a time where cultural norms were less fair to women.136 The philosophy focused on
Islamic teachings as isolated from all other forms of intellectualism.137
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Although the court did not publicize its reasoning, it seems that the appellate courts in
both Sahar Gul and Farkhunda’s cases favored neo-fundamentalism. These results in these cases
are more compatible with older notion of women’s rights. Additionally, there are neofundamentalist leanings in the response of some of the clergy to Farkhunda’s case. They decried
the women activists and advocated strict adherence and deference to conservative Islamic
interpretations.138
Additionally, although the overall outcome of the case had a neo-liberal leaning, there are
shadows of conservative thoughts. The death penalties and lack of due process given to the
perpetrators echo the earlier conservative thought and notions of deference to the strictest
interpretation of Islam without any adjustment for the religion’s cries for peace and human
rights.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A neoliberal interpretation of Islam is crucial for women’s rights moving forward in court
cases. Mediation, the most common form of arbitration and advocacy in Afghanistan, uses a neofundamentalist approach, and often results in unenforceable remedies to abuse.139 Although the
appellate court has adhered to neo-fundamentalism, the Supreme Court, which makes final
decisions, has used neoliberal conceptualizations of Islam during recent trials.
By emphasizing neoliberal conceptualizations of Islam, perhaps more women will be
willing to turn to the court system. Women who turn to neo-fundamentalist courts and mediators
because of fear of corruption—including the payment of bribes to move the legal process
along—lack a clear understanding of the legal process. Furthermore, they fear the imprisonment
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of the men who provide for their family.140 By increasing education and televising cases, as in
the Farkhunda and Paghman gang rape cases, perhaps women will come to trust the courts’
neoliberal conceptualization of Islam and will be encouraged to take their cases into court.
Although mediation is seen as the only solution, the goal should be to encourage women
to use the formal legal system.141 The informal legal system leans toward a conservative
approach to Islam, emphasizing the rights of the man and preservation of the family structure.142
However, with neo-liberalism budding in the formal courts, they may eventually be seen as a
better option for women. The following design elements that would create a better formal legal
system for women: televised trials, availability of civil remedies, and the facilitation of activism.
A. Televised Trials
Televising trials allows greater transparency of the law for the people of Afghanistan.
Both Farkhunda’s primary trial and the Paghman primary trial were televised. Both had high
levels of viewership. Both resulted in convictions for the abusers. When the judges are
accountable to the people, they are more likely to use conceptualizations of Islam that value
women’s rights and promote the values of the community, such as protecting women.
This stands in direct contrast to the appellate trials, which were not televised. Further, the
written opinions of the appellate courts are not always released, even when the law so requires.
For example, the opinion in the appeal of Farkhunda’s case has yet to be released. Thus, the
people have no idea why the perpetrators received a reduced sentence. By televising the trial, the
transparency is immediate, and the people of Afghanistan can better engage with the judicial
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system. Televising trials also allows women to become more familiar with the formal legal
system, and thus more likely to turn to it in the future.
B. Civil Remedies
One way to address a woman’s fear of going to the formal court system is to create a
system of civil remedies in the formal court as opposed to strictly criminal. This would be in line
with the neo-fundamentalist ideal of community and the health of the victim, rather than pure
retributive justice.143 A system which provides protective and restraining orders would help
ensure that a woman can still be protected without cutting off the flow of money to the family.144
Rights to alimony and a life in the family home could also be an aspect of this new neofundamentalist approach.
C. Facilitation of Activism
Afghanistan can strengthen women’s rights by the facilitating of activism in trials.
Particularly if the trials are televised, this can be a powerful way for civil society organizations to
reach a large audience of women and convince them that they will be supported at trial.
One way to do this is simply by allowing activists to file briefs with the court. Another
way would be to allow the activists to make statements in court. Activists would be able to
advocate for the courts to use a more neoliberal or reformist approach to the interpretation of
Islam.
CONCLUSION
The Afghan justice system’s turn to neoliberal and reformist conceptualizations of Islam
will help the country move forward in the field of human rights. This approach can encourage
women to participate in the formal legal system, where it is easier to measure adherence to
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women’s rights and human rights concerns. A neo-fundamentalist understanding of Islam could
contribute mechanisms that would to allow women to receive justice while also balancing the
needs of the home and family without fear of retaliation

